



ENGIME

Economic Growth and Innovation in Multicultural Environments

D14/17- Social Dynamics and Conflicts

Understanding the dynamics of multicultural cities

Purpose - Overview - Insights of Workshop III

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1. Purpose of Workshop III

The objective of the ENGIME network is to gain an understanding of the social, cultural and institutional conditions that are favourable to learning and innovation in multicultural cities.

This Third ENGIME workshop “Social Dynamics and Conflicts in Multicultural Cities” focuses on the relationship between diversity, inequality and conflict and their implications for economic welfare and growth.

First, conflict was analysed from an interdisciplinary background. In particular diversity and conflicts were discussed using insights from economics, law and psychology. These contributions focused on the consequences that religious beliefs may have on the generation of wealth and social inequality and the role of heterogeneity in solidarity and provision of public goods, on the relation between cultural traditions and civic virtue and the role of community policy to solve cultural conflicts. The psychology dimension brought in light the relationship between conflict in work teams and innovation and creativity at work. Second, current research on diversity and conflicts was presented through a series of case-studies. The focus was on interactions between immigrants and host society in different cities or neighbourhood types, the “established-outsider relation”, the role of languages and racism to increase our understanding of the factors influencing the possibility of conflicts.

This summary report provides an overview of Workshop III. The program with the different contributions, papers’abstracts and summary of keynote speakers talks are included as well as the list of all participants. Then, the main lessons and insights based on the contributions and discussions throughout the 2-days workshop are being presented followed by reflections on interdisciplinary research and future research questions that are pertinent to understanding diversity in multicultural cities.

2. Overview of Workshop III

2.1. Programme of the Workshop

Day One

9.30-10.00	WELCOME with coffee
10.00-10.30	Paper 1: Religion and Economics: The Case of Social Inequality in Latin America (Jose Caballero and Vicente Pons, Yale University)
10.30-11.00	Paper 2: Cultural Difference and Civic Culture (Richard Thompson Ford, Stanford Law School)
11.00-11.30	COFFE BREAK
11.30-12.00	Paper 3: Diversity and growth in US cities (Gianmarco Ottaviano, Univ. Bologna and FEEM, Giovanni Peri, Univ of California, Davis)
12.00-12.30	Discussion
12.30-13.45	LUNCH
13.45-14.30	Keynote speaker: Carnsten de Dreu (Professor of Organizational Psychology, University of Amsterdam)
14.30-15.15	Keynote speaker: Eliana La Ferrara (Associate Professor of Economics, Bocconi University)
15.15-15.45	COFFE BREAK
15.45-17.00	Panel discussion

Day Two

9.00-9.30	WELCOME WITH COFFEE
9.30-10.00	Paper 1: Diversity and inter-ethnic conflicts among adolescents (Joachim Brü?, Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflicts and Violence, University of Bielefeld)
10.00-10.30	Paper 2: The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood (David May, Aalborg Universitet)
10.30-11.00	COFFEE BREAK
11.00-11.45	Discussion of morning papers in small groups
11.45-12.30	Plenary discussion
12.30-13.45	LUNCH
13.45-14.15	Paper 3: The case of Baroda – India (Alaknanda Patel, University of Baroda)
14.15-14.45	Paper 4: Municipal Reform on the Island of Montreal. Tensions Between Two Majority Groups in a Multicultural City (Danielle Juteau, Sébastien Arcand, Sirma Bilge, Francine Lemire, Ethnic Relations, University of Montreal)
14.45-15.15	COFFEE BREAK
15.15-15.45	Paper 6: Anti-racist policy in France: from ideology to socio-political realities (John Crowley and Marie-Cécile Naves, The Interdisciplinary Center for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences, Paris)

- 15.45-16.15 Discussion of afternoon papers in small groups
- 16.15-17.00 Plenary discussion
- 17.00 Conclusive word by Dino Pinelli

2.2. Summary of invited speakers

Conflict and Innovation at Work by Prof. C.K.W. de Dreu, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Conflicts at work are current and commonly considered a “bad” in terms of performance. For example, managers spend 15% of their time on conflict management, conflicts predict costly turn-over and absenteeism from work and systematic bullying causes post-traumatic stress syndrome. Nevertheless it is argued that conflict and in particular task conflict may facilitate innovation in work teams at moderate levels more than at low or high levels. The key message is that conflict predicts creative thought and innovative practice in a curvi-linear fashion because moderate conflict produces optimal levels of cognitive tension. This is true only if conflict is task based rather than relationship focused and conflict occurs within a high-trust climate. In de Dreu studies, conflicts occur when parties perceive their interests and/or viewpoints to be different from those of interdependent others (Thomas, 1992). Innovation is defined as the introduction or application of goods, services, practices or procedures that are new to the social system and meant to increase effectiveness (west & far, 1990). Indeed, creativity is a necessary but not sufficient pre-condition. Innovation also needs critical selection, social support and implementation. They all require collaboration and joint effort which might themselves be at odds with the presence (even mild) of conflicts. Tests in two studies with self-managed teams using these definitions show that task conflict is related to innovation in work teams in curvilinear fashion. This result is consistent with the

general argument that tension levels in a work team have an inverted U-shaped relationship with team performance (Jehn, 1995). The result that task conflict and innovation are related in a curvilinear fashion points to the importance of managing conflict in work team. Indeed, stimulating task conflict in work teams while not falling into extremes leading to negative consequences for overall team performance seems to be the way forward for conflict management.

A more general implication of these results is that theories of organisational behaviour may be too often and strongly focused on linear effects and ignore the possibility that optimal levels of behavioural processes exist.

To summarise, the theory of Dewey (1922) seems to be right because a moderate level of conflict produces moderate level of cognitive activity; too little conflict implies inactivity and too much implies overload and rigidity of thought. This is true only when the group climate is characterised by high trust and conflict is task focused rather than interpersonal.

Solidarity in heterogeneous communities by Prof. Eliana La Ferrara, Università Bocconi and IGER, Italy.

In economics, diversity is often called heterogeneity. The relationship between heterogeneity within a group and its economic solidarity is intended here as the willingness of the group to share a common good and contribute to its provision. This affirmation is the start of the two main strands concerning heterogeneity and solidarity: 1. Heterogeneity and the provision of public good; 2. Heterogeneity and community formation. In the first case, theoretical models offer two ways of looking at heterogeneity. The “contribution approach” considers heterogeneity measured as inequality in “shares” (these shares can be about income, wealth, etc). The impact of economic heterogeneity on the provision of public goods is measured by looking at this impact on aggregate contribution, hence the “contribution approach”. The economic literature is based on three strands. According to Olson (1965) inequality is a good. Indeed, for a given group size, when the share of the benefits is positively related to individual wealth, richer members have more incentives to contribute resources and/or to monitor others. Higher inequality would therefore decrease the

free rider problem and lead to increase public good provision. Baland and Platteau (1997) on the other hand consider inequality is a bad. They show that the Olson results hold if and only if the group providing the collective good remains stable through time. If this assumption does not hold, this group might decrease in size and increased inequality may worsen the free rider problem for the poor and lead to less provision of public good. Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) and Bardhan, Ghatak and Karaivanov (2002) found a third way of relationing inequality and provision of public good: they find a U-shaped relationship between inequality and efficiency.

These models provide a rather deep analysis of the complex relationship between collective action and economic inequality but they are lacking extensions to consequences provoked by other types of heterogeneity. The most straightforward extension would be to view each income or wealth category as a separate type of heterogeneity. For example a society in which there is one very rich player and N-1 equally poor ones would be associated with a high degree of inequality and according to Olson would lead to a relatively high provision of the public good. But this society would not be considered as very heterogeneous in terms of types: there would be two types of people, 1 rich and N-1 exactly equally poor.

Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) have provided a theory which is linking directly “heterogeneity in types” to public good provision. This approach is called the “preference approach”. They assume that the different types of individuals have different preferences over the kind of public good provided. The novelty of this model is that the good is financed by a lump sum tax that is the same for everybody and decisions on the kind and amount of public good provided is voted by the majority. This way the amount of public good provided in equilibrium is decreasing in the average distance from the type of good preferred by the median voter. In this case, heterogeneity is considered as bad. This model brings flexibility in the role played by preferences and is therefore applicable to different contexts.

Empirical evidence on these models linking heterogeneity and public good provision are wide: for example, case-studies on irrigation projects in India (Bardhan, 2000) and Mexico (Dayton Johnson, 2000) shows that land inequality brings lower co-operation. Some infrastructure projects have found a U-shaped relationship between inequality and maintenance but others found a negative impact of social heterogeneity (measured

by clan, politics or religion) but also that good task design could compensate for this fragmentation.

The other strand of research concerning heterogeneity and solidarity deals with heterogeneity and community formation. The theory is based on two reasons existing to join a group: the utility provided from the good provided or the utility provided from participation. Under the “contribution approach” heterogeneity is measured in terms of costs or benefits procured to the population, and the outcome is the decision to join or not the community. The community “access rules” in place condition this approach. Indeed, open access (anyone can join provided she/he can pay the cost) have a tendency to be formed by relatively poor individuals whereas restricted access (allows the members of the group to exclude someone by majority vote) will have groups in favour of the relatively rich. Therefore the impact of heterogeneity in these types of model (La Ferrara, 2000) depends on access rules but also on the shape of income distribution. In particular, aggregate membership decreases under open access when heterogeneity increases in the lower part of the distribution while participation can actually increase under restricted access (if the upper part of the distribution is sufficiently skewed). Under the “preference approach”, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) consider a setting in which individuals prefer to interact with others who are similar to themselves in terms of income, race or ethnicity. In this setting, the type of the minority is less than proportionately represented in group. They show that heterogeneity can decrease participation even when people can sort into homogeneous groups. Alesina and Spolare (1997) study the effect of heterogeneity on the number and size of communities (countries). The costs of heterogeneity arise because in large and diverse countries individuals with different preferences have to share common policies so the average distance between the policy preferred by each individual and that chosen by the median voter increases with heterogeneity. There is therefore a trade-off between benefits of size and costs of homogeneous policies. Empirical evidence on community formation reach several interesting results: La Ferrara (2002) on Tanzania found that assets inequality leads to lower participation in groups and so does racial fragmentation (Alesina-la Ferrara 2000 on US).

But still crucial questions remain open: is heterogeneity exogenous? How should we measure it? Can heterogeneity be good?

2.3. Abstracts of the papers

Religion and Economics: the Case of Social Inequality in Latin America.

By Jose Caballero, Institute for Corporate Governance, Yale University and Vicente Pons, International Center for Finance, Yale University

Scholars in economics and sociology have debated the relationship between economics and religions for many years. This debate has been approached in three ways.

First, the “economics of religion” point of view analyzes economic policies from a religious perspective: economic policies are determined by religious beliefs. Second, the “religion of economics” perspective analyzes patterns of religious behavior from an economic framework by utilizing microeconomic tools to explain an individual’s religious activities. Finally the religion-economics relation is approached by the “economic effect” of religion or the consequences that religious beliefs may have on the generation of wealth. In this paper, we will focus on the latter approach. Max Weber’s thesis on the relationship between protestant religious ethic and economic outcomes argues that Protestantism generates certain attitudes in an individual that allows him to progress economically. Protestantism results in a way of thinking that leads an individual to strive for economic success, through the personal will to work hard, and the habit of not spending on frivolous self-indulgence. These attitudes foster initiative and innovation, which in turn are conducive to economic growth through “rational investment.” For many scholars this interpretation is a “travesty” of Weber’s ideas. However, for the purpose of this paper, to measure the relationship between Protestantism and social inequality, we assume the adequacy of this interpretation. On the other hand, in the context of Latin America, Marti-Barro has suggested that the degree of economic development in the region is the result of the “Latin American Fatalism.” In other words, he implies that the Latin American economic backwardness is due to the belief in the inevitability of a predetermined destiny and the resignation to accept it, and thus, to be contented with what one possesses. Fatalism is a way of understanding human existence as a condition in

which everyone's fate is already predetermined. This mind-set is the product of a religious colonial past (mostly catholic), which promoted such attitudes based on resignation and conformism. In the Latin American predominantly religious framework, a distant all-powerful God, against whom it is pointless to resist, and whose infinity wisdom in the creation of the world and society could not be questioned by a human being, determines an individual's destiny. As a result, Latin Americans have only one option: to be submissive to the system; ambitioning a better life or planning for the future is worthless. This fatalistic attitude is found mostly among the poorer groups of Latin America. Latin America is a region in which social inequality, assessed through income distribution, levels of education, access to housing and health coverage, is well marked. For instance, in 1980 income distribution in Central America was allocated in the following proportions: 57.4% of GDP to the wealthiest 20% of the population, 8.9% to the middle 60%, and 3.7% to the poorest one-fifth. If in a region like Latin America, there is a movement from Catholicism to Protestantism, or from a fatalistic-conformist-submissive mind-set toward a pragmatic income-conducive attitude, there should be a reduction on social inequality. Indeed, in the past 25 years there has been a Protestant explosion in Latin America. For instance, in Guatemala the Catholic percentage of total population has decreased from 85% in 1995 to 70.5% in 1998. Meanwhile, Protestant population has increased from 60,000 in 1962 to almost 3.5 million in 1998. This movement has taken place mostly among Indigenous and poorer groups of the Latin American society. By generating attitudes that leads to income accumulation, Protestantism should favor economically, in the case of Latin America, the indigenous and poorer groups of society. Therefore we should observe that social inequality has decreased in the region during the last decades. In this paper we measured social inequality through three dimensions. First, the "Economic dimension" or inequality based on the differences in income distribution per capita, access to housing and level of savings. Second, the "Social dimension;" that is inequality measured by access to health, education and the percentage of illiteracy. Finally, we approach inequality from the "Political dimension" or the percentage of voting, increases in the membership of political parties that promote social equality or that defend the interest of the "have-nots" of society. We demonstrate that the relation between religion (increase in

Protestantism) and the reduction of social inequality is robust, once we control for factors proven to reduce income inequality, such as economic growth and political orientation of the groups in power, in the countries we analyse.

Cultural Difference and Civic Culture.

By Richard Thompson Ford, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School

This paper will address the potential tension between two broadly stated policy objectives: one, the preservation of distinctive cultural traditions and two, the fostering of civic virtue, a sense of local community and the advancement of common civic enterprises.

Many scholars have argued that liberal societies have an obligation to accommodate the cultural traditions of various sub groups through legal rights and a redistribution of social resources. The "right to cultural difference" is now widely (if not universally) understood to be a basic human right, on par with rights to religious liberty and racial equality.

Other theorists writing in the liberal, civic republican, and urban sociology traditions have expounded on the necessity of civic virtue, urban community and common enterprises initiated and executed at the local or municipal level of government and/or private association. These theorists have argued that common projects, shared norms and social trust are indispensable elements of effective democratic government and are necessary to the altruism and public spiritedness that in turn support social justice. These two policy goals therefore may at times be in conflict. This conflict is especially severe in larger culturally diverse cities, where social trust and civic virtue are most needed and often in shortest supply. Policies designed to counter cosmopolitan alienation and anomie by fostering civic virtue, social trust and common social norms will inevitably conflict with the cultural traditions and sub group identification of some minority groups. Accommodation of any and all sub group cultural practices will make it difficult if not impossible to foster a common civic culture and social trust.

The bulk of the paper will examine such conflicts. For instance, many have argued that the best hope for revitalising urban politics is to promote municipal enterprises

and services that allow for citizen participation, such as community based policing and municipal utilities. Community policing is a good example of a city service that can foster social trust in and amongst culturally distinctive communities: by encouraging police officers to participate in local social events and become acquainted with local residents, community policing can improve relations between police and communities that typically distrust them by helping police become more sensitive to minority communities and by helping those communities better understand the demands of effective police work. Yet at the same time a key benefit of community policing involves the improvement of neighbourhood morale and quality of life through intensive policing of relatively minor crimes and the use of police to enforce informally social norms of behaviour. Anti loitering and anti vagrancy laws can improve quality of life by removing vaguely threatening people from the streets and can improve routine police work by allowing officers to preemptively intervene in potential sites of criminal activity before crime actually takes place. Many commentators have found that such effort are quite popular among minority communities who often feel under served by police (even as they also distrust police when they do intervene). But intensive community policing of this type almost inevitably runs afoul of the cultural practices of some groups, leaving community policing open to charge of "cultural hegemony."

Programmatically speaking, the paper will argue that such conflicts between cultural rights and civic norms must be confronted on the field of political debate and policy analysis, not in the language of civil rights. Rights discourse, with its inherent absolutism, is ill suited to the type of subtle trade-offs that these conflicts entail. While local government and public institutions must be sensitive to the needs of all cultural groups that they affect, the need for civic enterprise and social trust should not be subject to absolute and non negotiable demands for the accommodation of cultural traditions. The accommodation of some cultural traditions will impose severe costs in terms of strife, conflict and the inability effectively to pursue other important social goals-in at least some cases, the minority cultural traditions, and not the other social goals, should yield.

Diversity and growth in US cities.

By Prof. Gianmarco Ottaviano , University of Bologna and FEEM; Giovanni Peri, University of California, Davis)

As immigrant pressure grows in industrialised countries social scientists and policy makers wonder whether the associated increase in cultural diversity will turn out to be beneficial or detrimental to our future societies. Our work considers a purely economic aspect of this issue by studying whether diversity helps or harms productivity and its growth. On the one hand, if different cultures contribute different skills and expertise in producing goods and services, ethnic and linguistic diversity could enhance aggregate productivity. On the other hand, difficulties in integration and communication across different groups could harm aggregate productivity. We develop a theoretical model in which different cultural groups contribute different services but exchange amongst groups is hampered by cultural diversity. We find that in such model aggregate labour productivity depends on a measure of cultural diversity. Then we explore the empirical implication of the model using data on 160 U.S. cities for the period 1970-1990. The US economy is a useful reference. Cultural diversity has long been a key feature of that country. We find that linguistic and ethnic diversity increase average productivity and such effect is significant and possibly casual.

Diversity and inter-ethnic conflicts among adolescents.

By Dr. Joachim Brüß, Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflicts and Violence, University of Bielefeld

This paper concentrates on an important aspect during processes of migration: The interaction between immigrants and members of the host society. Early studies by Park (1924) and Bogardus (1925) employing social distance scales were able to identify conflicts and peaceful interactions between autochthonous and allochthonous groups. But in the longer term the assimilation models assumed a decrease in inter-ethnic tensions. More recent studies challenge this assumption by pointing at the development of ethnic colonies, dissimilation or even marginalisation of migrant groups (see Gordon 1964, Yinger 1981, Barrera 1988, Pedraza 1996 or

Bourhis/Moïse/Perrault/Sen cal 1997). Following these research results we expect that tensions between ethnic groups still exist and that conflicts and violent activities can particularly be observed in urban areas with comparatively high proportions of young immigrants (see also Dubet/Lapeyronnie 1994, H u ermann 1998, MacDonald 1997). Taking these developments into consideration the paper focuses more specifically on aspects of diversity, conflict resolution strategies and inter-ethnic violent activities among adolescents. The analysis is based on a quantitative longitudinal survey, that began in 2001 and is projected to conclude in 2006. In the first wave of the survey, 11,200 respondents participated, of which 6,100 were German youths, 3,500 Resettler and 1,600 Turkish youths. Violent activities are measured as hard forms, labelled as deviant behaviour, and soft forms, labelled as anti-social behaviour. Conflict resolution strategies are measured as bargaining or revenge oriented attitudes. A descriptive analysis will reveal the major pattern of violent activities between the three groups and their preferred conflict resolution strategies. It will be investigated whether members of the host society are more prone to violent behaviour against the immigrant groups or whether the opposite is the case. The explanatory models will finally investigate the effects of ethnic diversity in the area of living, school education, gender and conflict resolution strategies on violent behaviour. It will be tested whether bargaining as a preference for conflict resolution is able to prevent inter-ethnic violent activities. The analysis will further reveal whether we can talk of a more general explanatory pattern across the three ethnic groups.

The Struggle of Becoming Established in a Deprived Inner-City Neighbourhood.

By David MAY, AMID – Aalborg Universitet, Denmark.

The theory of established-outsider relations is a useful tool for examining conflicts across ethnic boundaries especially when analysing deprived inner-city neighbourhoods. The aim of this paper is twofold: it both extends the theory of established-outsider relations and presents the case of Dortmund Nordstadt in Germany. Nordstadt is an old inner-city neighbourhood that has been heavily influenced by the coal and steel industry throughout the last 1½ centuries.

Furthermore, Nordstadt has from its early days housed the newly arrived and in 1997, 41.1% of its inhabitants did not have a German passport. The theory of established-outsider relations has been developed by Norbert Elias 1960s and 1970s. According to this theory, the social cohesion of the established together with the stigmatisation of the outsiders lead to status and power differentials that exclude the outsiders and in turn produce more cohesion and stigmatisation. However, deprived neighbourhoods with a high percentage of immigrants cannot be analysed on their own. Here three levels of established-outsider relations overlap and effect each other.

On the first, the societal level, the two groups of the Germans and the immigrants stand opposite to each other. The legal system creates ab initio power differential that confines the immigrants to the positions of the outsiders. This structure is taken up on the levels below, re-produced, and at the same time superimposed by other developments.

On the second, the city level, the status of the outsiders is decided upon spatial criteria. Nordstadt is a big neighbourhood that is cut off from the rest of the city by the rails and industry and thus easy to stigmatise. Furthermore, these criteria are time and again linked with the first level of established-outsider relations as Nordstadt is a traditional immigrant neighbourhood. Thus the low status of the immigrants is taken as proof for the low status of Nordstadt.

On the third, the neighbourhood level, the other established-outsider relations are in part reproduced and in part changed by recent developments. This gives rise to specific conflicts and special ways of handling conflicts. Conflicts arise over the status and recognition of the different ethnic and religious groups, over the distribution of resources and defending the interests of the various actors, and over values and lifestyles of both actors and groups. These conflicts facilitate ethnicisation and stigmatisation when occurring across ethnic boundaries.

Here on the neighbourhood level, the immigrants can establish themselves to increasingly greater degrees due to their greater cohesion and due to their growing control over material re-sources in the neighbourhood. To some extent, immigrants begin ethnicising and stigmatising the Germans. However, the Germans of Nordstadt assume themselves being the established in their relation to the immigrants and attempt to implement the established-outsider relation from the societal level and hold

the immigrants responsible for being regarded as outsiders in the city-wide established-outsider relation. Yet, the Germans of Nordstadt do not have enough local cohesion to effectively exclude and disadvantage the immigrants on the local level. However, the advantage immigrants can gain through their greater cohesion on the local level is more than outweighed by the disadvantage on the societal level of established-outsider relations.

The Case of Baroda, India.

By Prof. Alaknanda Patel, Baroda, India.

India has been known as the land of many cultures. Since before the Common Era invaders / marauders have come from the North and left traces of their life. Over the years intermarriage and interaction among various groups built a kind of composite ethos that was the pride of this country.

Gujarat, an Indian state, has reflected this special aspect for over a millennium. In addition to the people of different religious faith like Hindu, Muslim, Jain, Christian and Zorastrian, various caste groups within the Hindus and migrant workers ensured a diversity of culture and lifestyle. This is especially true in the city of Baroda. This paper studies the dynamics of their coexistence.

Baroda is a large city of this state with a population of about 2,000,000. Till the mid-20th century it was a beautiful city with wooden-gabled houses, tree-lined avenues and large open space. Today it is transformed. Large oil refineries, fertilizer and petroleum complexes mark its boundaries. Industries, small and big, demands of residential housing, shopping centres, corporate offices have encroached on the surrounding farmland, orchards and gardens. Quaint old buildings have given way to soulless high-risers and the roads can hardly carry the yearly increase in traffic load. Noise and air pollution are a part of every Barodian's life.

Gujarat, till about two years ago, was an economically vibrant state with Baroda as its pride. Employment opportunities attracted fresh migration to the city, specially from the nearby tribal areas where constant logging and acid rain had destroyed much of their environment. Migration and conflict do not necessarily go together; the relationship between tribal, Hindus of lower castes and the Hindu dominant castes has

been mainly stress-free, largely because of their attempt to become a part of the mainstream Hindu society, possibly out of a fear of conflict. The pull of the majority then erases some of the cultural forms.

Despite sporadic troubles among different religious groups there was at least a veneer of calm in Baroda. But earlier this year in 2002, violence of an unbelievable dimension broke out between Hindus and Muslims; urban squalor, stress and struggle attacked the basic diversity of the society. Over 2000 people all over the state were killed and over 100,000 people were rendered homeless. It was extremely severe in Baroda where in one instance alone 14 people were burnt alive.

Why? This was not a conflict arising out of migration of outsiders but among people of the same soil and similar background, between Hindus and Muslims. The religious, social and cultural blend into one another in Indian society and in the last two decades religion has taken a very public posture. Religious differences like idolatry of many Gods versus the prayer to one Allah merge with cultural or lifestyle differences like food habits (eating of beef), attire and language. In cultural forms like music and art, the devotional music of the Hindu is different not only in content but in style as well. In art and architecture the Hindu depiction of animate forms poses a strong contrast to the Islamic stress on intricate designs.

Spatial segregation intensifies suspicion. With little social intercourse, rumours easily enhance the already existing mistrust and enmity; the Hindu asserts his identity through a greater public demonstration of his religious and cultural symbols and the Muslim reiterates his Islamic identity through his own religio-cultural traits. Diversity turns into divide.

With this background the critical factor in spreading the violence was economic. Monsoon had failed repeatedly, recession had hit the job market, 'sale' signs had no takers, people were going through extreme economic hardship. The memory of better times, exposure to the lifestyle of the world through international communication meant greater needs and aspirations; a fight for essentials became the central dynamic. For both communities diversity had created certain areas of specialisation in craft, art, trade, manufacture and other spheres. With economic distress, encroachments on each other's economic turf were unavoidable which in turn became a new source of

conflict. The Hindu masses were ready to demolish the outsider, the Muslim, the competitor.

There never is a set formula about the relationship between cultural diversity and conflict. Diverse cultures merge into the mainstream partly to avoid conflicts as in the case of tribal whereas in the case of the two major protagonists, Hindus and Muslims, conflict leads to greater attention to difference. In periods of extreme tension in this relationship, economic hardships, spatial pressures, competition for limited resources can lead to conflicts of catastrophic proportions.

Municipal Reform on the Island of Montreal. Tensions between two Majority Groups in a Multicultural City.

By Prof. Danielle Juteau, Chair in Ethnic Relations, University of Montreal; Sébastien Arcand, Ph.D. Candidate, Research Agent, Chair in Ethnic Relations, University of Montreal (presenter); Sirma Bilge, Ph.D., Research Agent, Chair in Ethnic Relations, University of Montreal; Francine Lemire, M.Sc., Research Agent, Chair in Ethnic Relations, University of Montreal

In contemporary democratic societies, ethnic diversity is an unavoidable element in the analysis of change, social cohesion and the transformation of majority-minority relations. Although immigration is historically rooted in these societies, the international conjuncture plays a preponderate role in this diversification of migratory flows. Accompanied by a predominant urbanisation, ethnic diversification is such that the social sciences, sociology in particular, have begun to examine this phenomenon via a multiplicity of theoretical approaches and field studies in order to grasp the implications of this social recombining. In that context, there has been a tendency to turn away from studies of the groups issuing from older migratory waves and of majority groups. Without wishing to question the relevance of work on recent immigrant groups and the attendant issues for democratic societies, the abandonment of studies of majority groups prevents us from understanding how, in given contexts, ethnic relations, understood in the widest sense of the term, are structured and transformed.

This presentation discusses the link between diversity and conflict in multicultural cities from the perspective of the transformation of ethnic relations grounded in a socio-spatio-historical context characterised by the co-presence of two ethnic groups—French Canadians and English Canadians—with significant access to resources and occupying a no less significant space in the field of social relations in Quebec society. Focusing on ethnic relations between these two majority groups, our study's point of departure is the recent merger of all the cities on the Island of Montreal into one large city, one of the most multiethnic in North America. In place since January 2002, this merger, which is itself a part of a process that affects other Canadian and Western settings, is a rich ground for the analysis of ethnic social relations. Characterised by the historical presence of these two colonising groups, the Montreal Island and Quebec Province in general have witnessed, since the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the inversion of traditional relations between the two groups. Linked to the emergence of the Quebec State, which adopted various laws intended to make the French the dominant language of public space, this transformation strengthened the power of French Canadians, who were the majority group demographically but the minority group historically in social and economic terms. It has also given rise to the emergence of new boundaries defined by language which have replaced, without completely encompassing, the former ethnic boundaries between the two groups. In the context of the demographic decline of the two groups, in which the insertion of immigrants into the Francophone collectivity is at the heart of the efforts by French Canadians to modify this relation of force to their advantage, we can note that, in institutional terms, there has been a decrease in the capacity of English Canadians to maintain their institutions in various sectors such as education, health and social services. In this conjuncture, the merger of Montreal Island cities into a French-language mega-city appears at first glance to extend this process, and the vigorous opposition of the English Canadian community reflects its strong feeling that this municipal merger will result in a number of perverse effects. Highly mediatized, the resistance to this merger by the Anglophone community, especially Anglophones of British descent who refuse to accept the disappearance of their municipalities, which they view as essential to the survival of their community, has

given rise to a resurgence of a conflict that had seemed to have been attenuated over the last few years.

This paper will analyse the various facets of this conflict by drawing out the socio-political factors that help to explain its development. In addition to a brief historical review of the specific nature of the Montreal context, the transformation of ethnic relations in Quebec, and the various language laws adopted over the past few decades, we will discuss the effects of these policies on the ethno-linguistic vitality of the Anglophone community of British descent. The sources, the object and the stakes of the current conflict will also be examined in order to draw out the role of language in the transformation of ethnic social relations. More generally, the case study of Montreal, where many kinds of ethnic and linguistic relations can be found, should enable a reconsideration of how ethnic social relations are understood by drawing the role of institutions and the importance of language as a marker for ethnic belonging.

Racism in France.

By CROWLEY John, NAVES Marie-Cécile, The Interdisciplinary Center for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences (ICCR), Paris.

Multiculturalism has been a major issue in the European social sciences for twenty years. Nevertheless, in being especially a normative theory of culture, it seems to lack its sociological facets and tends to hinder comparability. Yet, though social actors' reflexivity is probably essentially limited, the empirical elements of a cultural analysis (practices, discourses, believes...) are subject to performance or enactment. It can therefore be interesting to define and observe, theoretically, epistemological and methodological constraints that should be respected by all good uses of culture, and among them some supposed social mechanisms. Thus, « cultural groups » are analytically defined by identity, and normatively by respect or recognition. As a consequence, the existence and actions of such groups depend highly on the main orientations of national politics and public policies. In France, any mention of "ethnic" categories encounters deep suspicion, as conceptualisation and administrative codification deepen highly on French universalistic conception of equality, give rights to individuals only and not to groups, and fear that ethnicization of politics tends to

favour xenophobia. Thus, since the beginning of the 1980's, French policies have formulated "ethnic issues" in socio-economic rather than cultural terms, notably in the form of a search for a coherent urban policy (*politique de la ville*). Indeed, urban violence is a recurrent issue of both the media and political agenda, which often hits under-privileged suburbs and is generally said to be due to children of immigrant parents.

In order to illustrate our hypotheses and give European comparability food for thought, we suggest to study action and policies against racism in France, and more precisely two French specific issues which deal with the "city": urban violence and education. Yet, European comparison is difficult because racism reflects diverse circumstances and institutions, but also differentiated ideological frameworks. Thus, contemporary France's specific conceptual and legal frameworks are inscribed within its distinctive history, which is linked to the decolonization of North Africa in particular. Moreover, policy and politics are very closely intertwined. Sometimes, the initial policy framework addresses itself solely to immigration in the narrow sense (i.e. rules on entry and residence and mechanisms for their application) or to issues, such as urban decay, linked to immigration in political discourse. Besides, in the sociology of racism, there are two great paradigms: the prejudice, based on psychological and pulsionnal criteria; and everyday discrimination, which is often violent, as racism is above all a concrete social practice. For instance, some groups are stigmatised by pejorative modes of designation or by spatial or socio-economic discrepancies. Contemporary racism is multifaceted and constantly changing. The evolution of the stereotypical "foreigner" shows the inter-penetration of racism and broader social phenomena. Over the past decade or so, suburban unrest (in most French cities, inner-city areas have a generally favourable socio-economic profile) has framed everyday racism in terms of a rejection of "otherness", which is amplified by the media sensationalism.

France now has a comprehensive legislative and legal framework against racism, but civil society is also a main actor. In recent years, some associations have developed actions to raise public awareness and to increase mobilisation for the integration of "visible minorities". The issue of "racial violence" (murders, insults and discourses) raises major conceptual and methodological problems. Sport, especially football, is

sometimes linked to racism and to urban violence. But there is no presumption that the status of the victim (in terms of skin colour, religion, “origin”, nationality, etc.) in itself creates a presumption of “racial” or “ethnic” violence. This is partly common sense, partly a reflection of the French ideological climate, which, as we said, is hostile to “racial” or “ethnic” categorisation.

Furthermore, urban violence seems to be a French specificity. It corresponds in some respects to what is called elsewhere “youth violence”, and there is a widespread perception that current problems in France have something to do with a broader crisis of “the city” (la ville). Some researchers think that spatial and social exclusion is more striking than in other countries, because of the architecture of the houses and of town planning. Relations with the police also crystallise many aspects of violence in racial contexts in French society, because of a range of social and economic factors. Conversely, the police are routinely accused of racism both in language and in practices such as profiling.

In the educational field, violence is considered only as a symptom of hardened patterns of social inequality, as the classroom is said to be simply an extension of the street. Among other things, the territorial basis of the French school system is in principle strictly defined by compulsory catchment areas. This obviously means that the school system tends to reproduce social segregation in so far as it exists.

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3. Main Lessons and Insights

From the discussions, three main topics emerged that seem to be crucial in understanding the social dynamics and conflicts in multicultural cities. A first topic points to the importance of the relation between diversity and conflict and insists on its two-way nature. The second topic explore the question related to diversity and inequality. In particular, the influence of heterogeneity on the functioning of the economy (participation and public good provision) and the level of productivity is analysed. Finally, the dynamics of groups, their formation, division, and empowerment is looked at a theoretical level and using several case-studies.

1. A closer look at conflict

During the workshop we explored different forms of conflict and how each of those can be related to diversity. Conflicts are the consequences of differences of perceived interests or/and viewpoints between two independent parties. They can be based on preferences, personal taste, values, etc., i.e. *relationship conflicts*, or on procedures, policies, judgements of facts, distribution of resources and these are *task-conflicts*. They are therefore linked to cultural, ethnic, religious, etc. diversity but should not only be seen as a consequence of cultural diversity. Indeed, conflicts can happen even within very similar groups, at any level.

Conflict has commonly a bad image in terms of team effectiveness, growth and performance. Yet, in psychology of work and organisational theory, there seem to be a certain dimension of conflict which will stimulate critical aspects of team performance such as learning, creativity and innovativeness. Indeed, if conflict is task-based, research found that the relation between conflict and *creative* thought and/or *innovative* practice has an inverted U-shaped. In other words, while an increase in task conflict is associated with an increase in innovation, innovation decreases at relatively high levels of task conflict. So moderate conflict produces moderate level of cognitive activity. The role of *high trust* in fostering this positive effect of moderate conflict is also important.

Conflicts are also due to rejection of the “otherness” and are observed under the form of racism and urban or youth violence when it takes an extreme form. In sociology, they are often two paradigms used to explain or characterise conflicts: *prejudice* based

on pulsional criteria, and *discrimination* as a concrete social practice. Racial violence, or ethnic conflicts sometimes lead to changes in the legislative and legal framework of the country it happens. In this sense, conflicts could also be understood as innovative. Conflict and *migration* do not necessarily go together. There can exist stress-free relationships between migrants and residents/natives largely because of the attempt of the former to become a part of the mainstream society, and because of fear of conflict. This is done of course at the cost of erasing some of the cultural traditions of the migrants. Violence against immigrants is emphasised usually in period of economic hardships and *bargaining* as a preference for conflict resolution has been proposed as a successful solution to avoid conflict.

At the neighbourhood or local level, conflict arises over the status and the recognition of the different ethnic and religious groups, over the distribution of resources and defence of the interests of the various actors. These conflicts foster ethnicisation and stigmatisation. This could turn out to build greater *cohesion* in the group (at the local level especially) and therefore be an advantage at least for who belongs to the group.

It has also been argued that the critical factor in spreading violence and conflict is economic. *Coexistence* and sometimes promiscuity of different groups (natives versus immigrants for example) can give rise to daily conflicts or violence. But these conflicts are not always cross-cultural conflicts, but often assigned to *socio-economic and spatial segregation*.

In conclusion conflicts seem to be inevitable and are both a consequence and a reason of economic difficulties. Conflicts provoke losses of productivity (strikes), efficiency (communication break-downs), but economic slowdowns can give birth to them or nourish them. Especially when they are combined with bad urban planning. Meanwhile there seem to be a level at which conflict, or more precisely a special type of conflict can be positive for innovation (task conflict in a work team) and for social peace (conflicts resulting in institutional and legal modifications aimed at reducing previous inequalities). As diversity does not always mean conflict, conflict does not always mean bad. The recipe seems to be in the moderation of conflict, therefore avoiding financial and economic hardships for example, and in managing it (bargaining as a conflict resolution for example).

2. Cultural diversity, inequality and economic performance

The discussion also addressed the relationships between diversity and inequality in cities. Inequality is to be interpreted not only as income inequality and social differences but also as lack of political power, lack of social recognition and respect. We attempted to distinguish between diversity and inequality, highlighting the dimensions where they overlap or diverge and tried to explore the questions related to diversity, inequality, injustice and domination.

As seen earlier, one of the backbone of the discussion is the role of economics in fostering conflicts. Indeed, when economic conditions are bad, diversity, with a mix of bad architecture or urban planning, can increase tensions within a multicultural city, as the “other” becomes the first target to one’s problems. But is the reverse relationship also true: as bad economics can lead to bad diversity (i.e. conflicts) can bad diversity lead to bad economics?

An important part of the discussion was based on the role of diversity in economics, more precisely on its consequences on the provision of a public good and the productivity of an economy. Theories and empirical studies do not concord on whether *inequality* is a good or a bad for efficiency or public good provision. Yet there seem to be some evidence that land inequality or income inequality damages the level of co-operation between the different groups, or that ethnic or racial diversity decreases funding or spending for public goods. Similar results are found when looking at the literature on community formation: assets inequality or racial fragmentation lead to a lower level of participation in groups.

A deeper analysis of inequality also revealed that in addition to the economy, the *legal and cultural* sphere are also important. Tests on the effect of the protestanization of Latin America on the extreme social inequality in the region found a negative relationship between these two factors. When it is not *religion*, it could be the “*ethnicization*” of social relationship and a certain feeling of victimhood that could bring the economy down.

To mitigate this, it is important to mention the view that inequality is partly the product of the economic development of the nations and therefore could be considered as a “necessary evil”.

The relationship between diversity and *productivity* still remains relatively unexplored. On the one hand, if different cultures contribute different skills and expertise in producing goods and services, ethnic and linguistic diversity could enhance aggregate productivity. On the other hand, difficulties in integration and communication across different groups could harm aggregate productivity. Empirical analysis on US data, found that aggregate labour productivity depends on a measure of cultural diversity, in particular linguistic and ethnic diversity tend to increase average productivity.

3. To join or not to join the community

Conflicts may result from divisions in different groups. We underlined the importance of understanding the way people form groups and access to them. The composition and size of a group can depend on *access rules*. A first one, the “open access”, by which anyone can join provided he or she can pay the cost is shown to form a group by relatively poor individuals. A second rule, “restricted access”, allows the members of the group to exclude someone by majority vote; this one will have a tendency to be unbalanced in favour of the relatively rich. These two examples illustrate the fact that access rules combined with the shape of the income distribution influences participation in groups and inequality, even though this influence is ambiguous.

Groups can also be formed in a more “natural” manner, i.e. people with the same cultural traditions will gather together. Then the conflict at stake is not only concerning cross-cultural diversity but also, especially in larger culturally diverse cities, a conflict between two policy goals: the preservation of *cultural traditions* as many political liberals advocate and the necessity of *civic virtue* and *social trust*, often in short supply. The accommodation of some cultural traditions impose costs in terms of strife, conflict and the inability to pursue effectively important social goals. The discussion lead to the result that the need for civic values and social trust should not be subject to absolute and non negotiable demands for the accommodation of cultural traditions. The role of institutions into preserving those civic values is of the utmost importance. For example municipalities in Montreal are viewed as essential to the survival of the community established there. Their disappearance gave rise to an

increase in conflicts that seemed to have been attenuated over the last few years. So in the case when there are two ethnic groups grounded in a socio-spatio-historical context, both of them with significant access to resources and occupying a significant space in the field of social relations, it seems relevant to understand “the game of powers” between the two groups. Language laws for example can be seen as compensating for the minority in social and economic terms. Indeed, the major group in *size* is not always the most powerful in terms of education and wealth. The conflict or trade-off is then to find a compromise between the benefits of size of the group and the costs of homogeneous policies (loss of some cultural or sub-cultural traditions to the benefit of homogeneity). There seem to be indeed a threshold beyond which diversity turns more often into *division*. A case-study on adolescents belonging to different ethnic origins finds that the level of local diversity can slightly disadvantage one group, in particular the immigrant groups, being more often targeted by the native group: 10 to 20% (share of one group TO CHECK) would be the turning point where conflicts arise. A higher percentage would not necessarily mean more conflicts. As the minority group is more represented, its *power* increases, institutions take the group into account and therefore leave less margin for potential bones of contention. The recommendation is then for local administration to channel extra attention and care into areas with a sizeable “minority” group. The role of the school system for example, viewed from the perspective of diversity, is to organise and facilitate the peaceful coexistence of differences within the public sphere of civil society (for example, “ethnic management” of the schooling of children immigrants in France). More generally, mediation of cultural conflict through *political dialogue* is also helping diminishing tensions.

Social cohesion and the formation of groups find also an explanation in the theory of *established-outsider figurations*. Indeed, it claims that the social cohesion of the established together with the stigmatisation of the outsider leads to status and power differentials (as saw previously) that exclude the outsiders and in turn produce more cohesion and stigmatisation. This is a way of explaining group cohesion; there also exists types of cohesion based on social oldness. There are three levels that overlap and affect each other which influence the established-outsider relations: societal level (two groups stand opposite to each other), city level (spatial hierarchy),

neighbourhood level. An interesting research result concerns the evolution of certain established- outsider relationship which can modify to the point where the established are not always who we think. Indeed, immigrants can become the established one due to their greater cohesion and their growing control over material resources in a neighbourhood for example. Immigrants can then stigmatise the “former established” (as they do not have enough local cohesion to exclude and disadvantage the immigrants). Dynamics in terms of migrations but also in terms of cultural changes and religious developments give motion to the groups which increases difficulty to anticipate and manage conflicts.

4. Interdisciplinary research

The different contributions in this third workshop were coming from different disciplines and backgrounds leading to reflections on the way interdisciplinary research can and needs to be done.

We managed to overcome a important point underlined during the first workshop about methodological issues. Indeed the discussion let space to a real debate and learning from each other without discussing what is often the most 'fixed' part of each discipline. Therefore, discussion on methodological issues were replaced by debate and co-operation. The theme of the workshop itself, the progress made during the second workshop on inter-cultural communication and its different models might have helped to make participants and speakers aware of the risks of interdisciplinary conflicts and communication break-downs. Consequently, interdisciplinary research in this case worked well.

In addition to multi-disciplines we also had very different types of works exposed. Theories, empirical studies, case-studies, story-tellings (or qualitative methods) also contributed to the “inter-disciplinarity” of the workshop. Research did not suffer from it as all made an effort to adapt their presentations and conclusions to a wider audience.

5. Research questions

To conclude, we present here the main research questions that emerged throughout the plenary and small group discussions.

Questions related to the economic effects of conflict:

- ? In psychological studies, the importance of managing conflict at work was underlined. How to do it and how to expand it at the city level in order to develop creativity/innovation at the industrial and societal level ?
- ? Theories of organisation behaviours may be too focused on linear effects such as: more heterogeneity means less efficiency. What is the alternative? How to develop a methodology which comprehend more automatically non linear effects?

Questions related to diversity :

- ? The accommodation of some cultural traditions will impose severe costs in terms of strife, conflicts and inability to pursue other social goals. What can institutions do to mitigate those risks? What is their role in giving more or less importance to a language knowing that is often a marker for ethnic belonging?
- ? A more general request lies in the lack of official statistics about “minorities”. In Europe, it is indeed impossible to build time-series or panel data at a sufficiently detailed level (NUTS2/3) because of the lack of data and of homogeneity in which data can be found for each country. Measuring cultural diversity would require more informations on religions, ethnic or racial origins, language used at home, etc.

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